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cuss the major policy failures that have led to the ruinous situation
of the underclass today.

THE NEW FREEDOM: INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM IN THE SOCIAL LIVES OF AMERICANS.
By William A. Donohue.t New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 1990. Pp. 250. Cloth, $29.95.
Edward J. Erler 2

The motto of the Invincible Order of Assassins, an eleventh
century Islamic sect described by Nietzsche as "that order of free
spirits par excellence," was: "Nothing is true, everything is permitted. "3 According to Professor William Donohue, this has become
the effective motto of "the ascendant idea" of contemporary American morality. His studied conclusion: "Something has gone
wrong." Indeed!
For a sociologist Professor Donohue is unusually insightful in
his analysis of the root causes of the "new freedom" that he deplores. But his account of the new American morality is more than
insightful: it is written with a verve that is altogether rare in academic works. It is also infused with something that is even rarer in
academia-a genuine moral outrage about the condition of American society. In fact the book as a whole might be characterized as a
refreshingly honest (and sustained) cri de coeur, culminating in a
lament that the new freedom has destroyed our capacity for moral
outrage. But as Donohue rightly points out, the capacity to feel and
express moral outrage inspired by what James Madison called "a
consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes"4 is the necessary
cement of any civilized society. The new freedom has simply provided the solvent that will dissolve the moral connections that form
the basis of every decent society. Yet it is precisely this spiritedness
or thumos which leads men to sustain and protect the values of the
community that ideological liberalism-the source of the new morality-views as the greatest obstacle to progress.
The revolution that produced the new morality, according to
I. Adjunct Scholar, Heritage Foundation.
2. Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, California State University,
San Bernardino.
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, 3 Genealogy of Morals sec. 24 (tr. Walter Kaufman and R.J.
Hollingdale, Vintage Books, 1967).
4. Federalist 10 (Madison) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 56, 64 (Wesleyan U.
Press, 1961 ).
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Donohue, is unique: "Previous revolutions have been motivated out
of despair against poverty, misery, and injustice. This revolution is
different: it is motivated out of despair against the limitations of the
human condition. It is the ultimate revolution." It is, in fact, a
revolt against the limits of human nature. The watchword of the
"new" revolution is "liberation"-liberation against all restraints,
natural or conventional. But as Donohue cogently notes, "man is
essentially going to war against himself. It is a war he cannot hope
to win."
None ofthis is exactly a mystery. The whole course of modern
science and philosophy has been the progressive denial of either natural or divine limits to the human condition. What we are witnessing today in liberation ethics and liberation theology is the
beginning of the end of the modern project. "What makes the new
freedom so unique," Donohue writes, "is its insistence that every
individual has a right to be totally liberated from everything that
constrains him." Donohue traces the powerful impact of this ethos
on various aspects of American society: the family, schools, religion, law, sexuality, children's rights, and so on. As readers of this
journal know, all of these topics have constitutional dimensions. If
the work seems too ambitious, Donohue cogently sticks to the narrow theme of the "new freedom" and its influence in shaping the
various relations of society. He is a shrewd observer and a trenchant critic; his critics no doubt will accuse him of indulging in "pop"
sociology-but if so, Donohue will simply have proven that this is
sociology at its best.
The revolt against nature is, of course, the defining characteristic of all "liberation" movements. Donohue quotes radical feminist
Shulamith Firestone's diatribe against the two strongest forces conspiring to oppress women: convention and nature. "Feminists have
to question, not just all of Western culture, but the organization of
culture itself, and further, even the very organization of nature."
Donohue laconically comments that "[t]here is no better description of what the new freedom is all about than this."
The bulk of Donohue's critique of the "new freedom" is directed against what he sees as the development of radical individualism. Radical individualism manifested as a kind of moral
autonomy stands in contrast to the "authority, tradition, and custom" that are the essential ingredients of every civilized society. As
Donohue notes, the "belief in a society of total, uninhibited expressions of individuality is a contradiction in terms; society demands at
least some subordination of the individual to the social." In the
quest for individual autonomy there is no regard for the public
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good, those things-principles, values and traditions-that define
the community itself.
"The new freedom," Donohue laments, "tolerates no abridgments of liberty and regards appeals to the common good as unconscionable infringements on the rights of the individual. •• Donohue
maintains that liberalism once inculcated a strong sense of responsibility as the necessary counterpart to rights. The idea of responsibility has, however, been entirely lost in what Donohue calls the
"rights mania" shuffle. Responsibility was once part of the idea of
self-interest rightly understood, a recognition that one's individual
interest was intimately connected to the interest of society as a
whole. This sense of responsibility-however minimal it might
have been-has been virtually extinguished in the most self-serving
pursuit of private interest. And this private interest is only thinly
disguised as the pursuit of rights. "The single-minded pursuit of
rights," Donohue observes, "has jettisoned an interest in serving the
common good .... We have come to think of rights as nothing more
than a weapon of self-interest."
It is certainly true that the tension between individual rights
and the public good is most evident in liberal democracies. The
emphasis on private rights does tend to make the citizens of liberal
democracies self-centered. Thus the existence of the common good
will always be in some sense problematic. Yet, as Donohue clearly
points out, the public good does not exist at the expense of private
rights, nor does the existence of private rights render the existence
of the public interest impossible. It was Marx who, most notably in
On the Jewish Question, argued for the abolition of rights in the
name of community. The existence of liberty in the form of rights
translated the individual into an "isolated nomad"-a "circumscribed individual"-incapable of community life.s But as Donohue makes quite clear, there is no necessity of choosing between the
extremes of communism and radical individualism. Indeed, Donohue rightly maintains that private rights flourish when citizens
share a well-defined sense of public purpose and public-spiritedness.
For it is in the presence of the common good that the ideas of rights
and responsibilities go hand in hand. In simple terms, no one's
rights are secure unless the rights of all are secure. The obligation
to secure one's own rights therefore simultaneously imposes the obligation to secure the rights of all. This is the necessary but not
sufficient condition of the common good in liberal democracies.
Donohue is not the first nor the most incisive critic of the con5. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels
Reader 26, 42 (W.W. Norton, 2d ed., 1978).
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temporary "rights industry." But he does succeed admirably in
clarifying its relationship to his principal thesis. In the rights mania
that obviously exists today, no one speaks for the common good or
the public interest. Rights are seen as simply private interests or
claims without the necessity of responsibility. The ethos of the new
freedom is liberation without responsibility. Civil rights groups
have simply become private interest groups engaged in lobbying for
special privileges or exemptions which they deign to call "civil
rights." As Donohue shows, the civil rights industry indulges a
conception of rights without responsibility, a conception that endangers the existence of civil rights because at bottom it translates
rights into nothing more than self-interested claims.
One legal writer has described this new conception of rights
with unabashed clarity: rights are claims "made by or on behalf of
an individual or group of individuals to some condition or power."6
Rights are thus merely positive claims to entitlements or positions
of power. And there are no limits either to what can be claimed as
a right or as to what might be claimed as its source. As this same
writer notes, "the right may be a 'liberty,' 'prerogative,' 'privilege,'
'power,' 'exemption,' or 'immunity,' [and] may have its source in
law or morals or custom; it may be comparative or noncomparative;
it may consist of a principle or a policy; it may be absolute or defeasible."7 It is no longer possible to speak of the rights of citizens; one
must instead speak of the rights of gays, blacks, Hispanics, women,
ad infinitum.
But while the rhetoric of rights is still intact it is clear that the
special pleadings of these various groups no longer have anything to
do with rights properly understood. In the end, the concept of
rights as claims to privileges or entitlements is governed only by the
interest of the stronger, where there are only claims of preferment
but none of justice. Justice is the provenance of the commonwealrights understood as merely claims or privileges are the dissolution
of the commonweal and therefore the dissolution of justice. In the
Federalist, Madison spoke of the new society envisioned by the
Constitution as one animated by "principles ... of justice and the
general good."s Justice--as opposed to the interest of the
stronger-is intimately connected to the general good. It is the architectonic principle which defines the idea of rights. To claim a
right is simultaneously to accept the responsibilities of the common
interest of society. Otherwise, the exercise of rights will be as non6.
7.
8.

Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 540 (1982).
Id. at 540-41 (footnotes omitted).
Federalist 51 (Madison) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist at 347, 353 (cited in note 4).
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existent in civil society as they are in the state of nature. Madison
cogently remarked that:
[J]ustice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society.
It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or
until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms
of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of
nature where the weaker individual is not secured against the
violence of the stronger.9

But justice can never be simply the sum of the various claims
to preference made on behalf of the various groups in society. The
claims themselves must be moderated by a sense of the public
good-at a minimum, the claims must be informed by a concept of
self-interest rightly understood. But the rights mania that prevails
today has no regard for the community. Madison taught us that
justice is the necessary ingredient of liberal democracy; without it
there is no hope of avoiding majority faction. Donohue reminds us
in a very timely and useful fashion of the importance of Madison's
lesson. We may blithely go about our business of extending rights,
only to find that in the end we have become the slaves of our own
passions. No self-governing and free people can be ruled by "the
tyranny of their own passions."to It almost goes without saying
that the morality of today's new freedom has nothing to do with
self-government. Liberation is the submission to tyranny under the
guise of freedom. Donohue sees this clearly. His insight is all too
rare-among academics it is virtually non-existent.

THE HOLLOW MEN: POLffiCS AND CORRUPTION
IN HIGHER EDUCATION. By Charles J. Sykes. 1 Washington, D. C: Regnery Gateway. 1991. Pp. xii, 356. Cloth
$19.95.
Maurice J. Holland 2
Although its author mercifully refrains from quoting those
overused lines of Yeats, this book brings to mind the ones about the
9.
10.

Id. at 352.
Federalist 63 (Madison) in Cooke, ed., The Federalist at 422, 425 (cited in note 4).

I. Freelance writer, formerly a reporter for The Milwaukee Journal and formerly editor of Milwaukee Magazine.
2. Dean, School of Law, University of Oregon.

